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In a seminal paper, Wilson (1978) introduced two notions of core of an economy with 
differential information, the coarse core and the fine core.  Since Wilson's work several 
alternative concepts of core have been proposed in the literature.  Among them are 
the private core introduced in Yannelis (1991), and the weak fine core introduced in 
AlIen  (1991)  and Koutsougeras  and Yannelis  (1993).  More recently,  Vohra  (1997) 
introduced the notion of incentive compatible core,  and Volij  (1998)  the notion of 
internally consistent core. 
The ex-ante fine and weak fine cores were studied by Allen (1991), Koutsougeras 
and Yannelis  (1993),  and Einy,  Moreno and Shitovitz (1998).  In the present work 
we  study the relationship between the (interim)  fine  core  and the ex-post core  of 
an economy with differential information.  In Wilson's fine  core the traders have the 
opportunity to communicate (i.e.,  to exchange information);  specifically,  the infor-
mation given to every member of a blocking coalition is the joint information of the 
members of the coalition.  In addition, we assume that a blocking allocation must be 
measurable with respect to the "joint partition" of the members of the coalition (our 
main result, however,  remains true without this additional assumption). 
We consider an atomless exchange economy (see Aumann (1964)) with differential 
information in which  the space of states of nature is  finite.  We  show that under 
standard conditions,  in such  economies  the  (interim)  fine  core  is  a  subset  of the 
ex-post core  (see  Theorem 1).  (Since we  assume that blocking allocations must be 
measurable with respect to the joint information of the blocking coalition, our interim 
fine core might be a larger set than Wilson's fine core; therefore this result holds also 
for  vVilson's  fine  core.)  Moreover,  under these conditions the ex-post  core  of the 
economy is non!empty, while the fine  core may be empty (see Example 3.1).  Hence 
the fine core may be a proper subset of the ex-post core.  We show that the inclusion 
result does not hold for economies with a finite number of traders. 
1 2  The Model 
We consider a pure exchange economy £. with differential information.  The commod-
ity space is  ~~. The space of traders is a measure space (T, 2:, J-L),  where T is a set (the 
set of traders), 2: is a a-field of subsets of T  (the set of coalitions), and J-l  is a measure 
on 2:.  The space of states of nature is  a measurable space (0, F), where 0  is a finite 
set and :F is a field of subsets of O.  The traders do not necessarily know which state 
of nature W  E 0  that actually occurred, but they may have some information about 
the state of nature. We assume that the information of a trader t E T is described by 
a measurable partition lIt of o. We denote by Ft  the field  generated by lIt. If  Wo is 
the true state of nature, trader t observes the member of lIt which contains Wo.  Every 
trader t  E  T  has a probability measure qt  on F  which represents his  prior beliefs. 
For simplicity it is  assumed that if A E F  is a non-empty set, then qt(A) > 0 for all 
t E T. The preferences of a trader t E T  are represented by a random utility function, 
Ut  : 0  x  ~~ -t  ~+  such that for every x E  ~~, the function Ut(·, x) is F-measurable. 
It is  also assumed that for  every (t, x)  E  T  x  ~~, the mapping (t, x) -t Ut(w, x) is 
2:  x  B  measurable,  where w  is  a fixed  member of 0, and B  is  the a-field of Borel 
subsets of ~~. 
An assignment is a function x : 0 x T -t  ~~  such that for every w  E 0 the function 
x(w,·) is J-L-integrable on T,  and for every t E T  the function x(·, t) is F-measurable. 
There is  a  fixed  initial assignment  e;  e(w, t)  represents the initial  endowment of 
trader t E T  in the state of nature w E o. An allocation is an assignment x such that 
IT x(w, t)dJ-l  ~  IT e(w, t)dJ-l for every w E O. 
Since 0  is finite there is  a finite number of different information fields Ft,  t  E T. 
We denote by F1, ...  Fn  the n distinct information fields of the traders.  We assume 
that F  =  V~=l J:i , which means that F  contains no superfluous events about which no 
trader has information, and therefore cannot affect anyone's consumption decisions. 
We  use  the following  notations.  For  two  vectors  x  =  (Xl, ... , Xl)  and  y  = 
(Y1, ... ,Yl)  in  ~l we  write x  ~ y  when  Xk  ~ Yk  for  all  1  ~ k  ~ 1,  x  >  Y when 
x  ~  y and x =I y, and x »y  when Xk  > Yk  for all 1 ~  k  ~  l. 
In the rest of the paper an economy £.  is an economy with differential information 
2 as it has been just described.  Also for an economy £ and a state of nature wEn, we 
denote by £(w)  the full  information economy in which the commodity space is  ~+, 
the space of traders is  (T, E, J.L),  and for every trader t E T his initial endowment is 
e(w, t)  and his utility function is Ut(w, .). 
3  The Fine and Ex-Post Cores 
In this section we  define the ex-post core and the interim fine  core of an economy 
with differential information, and we show that if the space of traders of an economy 
is  non-atomic (that is,  the population measure  J.L  on (T, E)  is  non-atomic) then the 
interim fine core is a subset of the ex-post core. 
A function U  :  ~~  - ~  is  (strictly) increasing if for  all x, y E  ~~, (x > y) x»  y 
implies u(x) > u(y). 
Throughout the section we refer to the following conditions. 
(A.l) For every wEn, IT e(w, t)dJ.L » o. 
(A.2)  For all t  E  T  and wED, the function Ut(w,·)  is  continuous,  and strictly 
increasing on  ~~. 
(A.3)  For all t E T  and wED, the function Ut(w,·)  is  continuous, increasing on 
~~, and vanishes on the boundary of ~~. 
An allocation x  is  an ex-post core  allocation for  an economy E if there does not 
exist a coalition SEE, an assignment y, and a state of nature Wo  E n such that 
(3.1)  I1(S) > 0, 
(3.2)  Is Y(Wo, t)dJ.L  :::; Is e(wo, t)dJ.L,  and 
(3.3)  Ut(wo, y(wo, t)) > Ut(wo, x(wo, t)) for  almost all t E S. 
If  there exis~s S,  y, and Wo  such that (3.1) - (3.3)  are satisfied then we say that 
y  is  an ex-post improvement of S  upon x  at wo.  The ex-post core  of an economy £ 
is the set of all ex-post core allocations of E. 
The ex-post core of an economy with differential information and its relationship to 
the set of rational expectations equilibria were studied by Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz 
(1998), who show that the ex-post core is non-empty under conditions (A.l) and either 
3 (A.2)  or (A.3). 
Let £ be an economy with differential information, and let 1 ~  i  ~  n  (recall that 
n is the number of distinct information fields of the traders of E).  Define 
We assume that for all 1 ~  i  ~  n the set 7i is measurable (i.e., 7i E  ~) and p,(7i) > o. 
For every 8  E ~  let 
/(8) =  {i 11  ~  i  ~  n,  and p,(8nT i )  > o}. 
If  Q is a subfield of F, f : n ----+  1R+  is an F-measurable function, and t E T we denote 
by EtU I  Q)  the conditional expectation of f  with respect to qt. 
An allocation x is an interim fine  core  allocation for  an economy £ if there does 
not exist a coalition 8, an assignment y  and a non-empty event A E ViEI(S) Fi such 
that 
(3.4)  J-L(8)  > 0, 
(3.5)  Is y(w, t)dJ-L  ~  Is e(w, t)dJ-L,  for  every w E A, 
(3.6)  for  all t E 8, y(., t)  is  ViEI(S) )=i-measurable, and 
(3.7)  for  all w E A, 
iEI(S)  iEI(S) 
almost everywhere on 8. 
If  there exists 8, y, and A  E  ViEI(S) Fi such that (3.4) - (3.7)  are satisfied then 
we say that y  is  an interim fine  improvement of 8  upon x  on A. The interim fine 
core  of an economy £ is the set of all interim fine core allocations of £.  , 
Our definition of interim fine  core is that of Wilson's (1978) fine  core,  with the 
difference that in Wilson's definition a blocking assignment may not be measurable 
with respect to the joint information of the blocking coalition.  Assuming measur-
ability of a blocking assignment makes it more difficult for  a coalition to block an 
allocation,  and therefore the resulting core may be larger than Wilson's fine  core. 
Thus, the inclusion established in Theorem 1 below also holds for Wilson's fine core. 
4 The measurability of the blocking assignment with respect to the joint information 
of the blocking coalition is also assumed in AlIen (1991), Koutsougeras and Yannelis 
(1993)  and Vohra (1997).  We now state and prove our result. 
Theorem 1.  Assume that c is  an atomless economy (i.e.,  such that the population 
measure  J1  on  (T,~) is non-atomic) that satisfies conditions (A.l) and either (A.2) 
or (A.3).  Then the interim fine  core  of C is a subset of the ex-post core  of c. 
Proof:  Let x  be an interim fine  core allocation of an atomless economy c.  As-
sume, contrary to our claim, that x is not an ex-post core allocation of c. Then there 
exists a coalition S E  ~  with J1(S)  > 0,  a state of nature Wo  E n, and an assignment 
y  such that Is Y(Wo, t)dJ1  :s;  Is e(wo, t)dJ1,  and Ut(wo, y(wo, t))  > Ut(wo, x(wo, t)) for 
almost all t  E  S.  Define the function x : T  ---+  ~~ by x(t) =  x(wo, t)  for  all t  E  T. 
Then x is  an allocation of the full  information economy c  (wo).  Moreover, x is  not 
in  the core  of the economy £(wo).  Therefore by the Theorem of Vind  (1972)  (see 
also  Proposition 7.3.2  in  Mas-Colell  (1985)),  there exists  a  coalition Q  E  ~ with 
J1( Q)  > J1(T)  - min {J1(T1) , ...  J1(Tn )}  ,  and an integrable function y : T  ---+  ~~ such 
that Isy(t)dJ1::;  Is e(wo,t)dJ1,  and Ut(wo,y(t))  > Ut(wo,x(t))  for  almost all t  E  Q. 
Let A(wo) be the atom of the field F  containing Wo.  Define a function z : n x T  ---+  ~~ 
by 
z(w, t)  = 
{ 
y(t)  if w E A(wo) 
e(w, t)  otherwise. 
Then z(·, t)  is .r-measurable for  all t E T.  Therefore z is  an assignment in c.  We 
show that z is  an interim fine improvement of Q upon x on A(wo). 
Since e(w,·)  =  e(wo,') for  all w E  A(wo)  (because e(·, t)  is F-measurable for  all 
t ET), we have< 
is z(w, t)dJ1::; is e(w, t)dJ1, 
for  all wEn. 
Now  as  J1( Q)  > J1(T)  - min {J1(T1), ...  J1{Tn )} ,  we  have J{ Q)  =  {I, ... n}, and 
ViEI(Q) F;,  =.r.  Therefore  A(wo)  E  ViEI(Q) F;,.  Since  for  all t  E  T  the function 
5 Ut(·,x(·, t))  is F-measurable, for all t E T we have 
and 
Et(Ut{-,x(·,t)) I V :Fi)  =  Ut{-,x(·,t)), 
iEI(Q) 
Et (  ul,  z (  ., t)) I V  :Fi) =  Ut (-, z (  ., t)). 
iEI(Q) 
Now for  all W E A(wo)  we have 
Et(Ut{-, z(·, t)) I  ViEI(Q) Fi)(W)  = Ut(w, z(w, t)) = Ut(w, y(t)) = Ut(wo, y(t)) 
> Ut(wo, x(t)) =  Ut(wo, x(wo, t)) =  Ut(w, x(w, t)) 
=  Et (Ut {-, x(., t)) I  ViEI(Q) Fi)(W). 
Thus, z is an interim fine improvement of Q upon x on A(wo), which contradicts the 
fact that x is a interim fine core allocation of £. D 
The following example shows that in atomless economies the interim fine core may 
be a proper subset of the ex-post core.  In fact, in this example the interim fine core 
is empty, while the ex-post core is not. 
Example 3.1. Consider an economy £ in which the commodity space is  ~~, and the 
set of traders is  ([0,3], E, /1),  where E is the t7-field of Borel subsets of [0,3]  and /1  is 
the Lebesgue measure.  The space of states of nature is n  =  {WI' W2}, and F  =  2f!. Let 
TI  = [0,1], T2  = (1,2], and T3  = (2,3]. The information partition of a trader t  E  Tl 
is  ITI  = {{WI' W2}},  his prior is ql =  (~, ~), and his initial endowments are e(wI' t) = 
e(w2,t)  = (4,0). The information partition of a trader t  E  T2  is  IT2  = {{Wl,W2}} ' 
his  prior is  q2  =  (~, ~), and his  initial endowments are e(wl, t)  = e(w2, t)  =  (0,4). 
Finally, the information partition of a trader t E T3  is  IT3  =  {{WI}, {W2}} , his prior 
is  q3  =  (~, ~), and his initial endowments are e(wI' t) = (4,0) and e(w2' t) = (0,4). 
All traders hav~ the same utility function, given for  (w, (x, y))  E n x  ~~ by 
U(W, (x, y)) =  FY. 
Let x be the allocation in £ given by 
{ 
(2,1) 




(2,4)  t E TI 
X(W2' t) = 
(1,2)  t E T2 UT 3. 
It is  easy to see that x  is  the unique ex-post core allocation of the (atornless) econ-
omy e.  Moreover,  x  is  not an interim fine  core allocation of e.  Indeed,  define the 
assignment y in e given by 
whereas 
y(W, t) =  {  (2,2) 
e(w, t)  otherwise. 
Et(u(·, y(., t)) I V  Fi )  =  2 
iEI(S) 
4)2 
Et(u(·,x(·,t)) I V Fd = -3- < 2. 
iEI(S) 
Therefore y  is  an interim fine  improvement of S upon x  on n.  Thus, x  is  not an 
interim fine core allocation of e.  By Theorem 1, the interim fine core is empty.  Note 
also that since the Wilson's fine  core is  a subset of our interim fine  core,  it is  also 
empty in this example. 
The allocation x  in Example 3.1  is  a rational expectations equilibrium alloca-
tion of e (see Radner (1979)  and AlIen (1981)), which corresponds to a "completely 
revealing"  equilibrium price system p, where p(wd = G, j) and P(W2) = (j, ~). 
Our next example shows that Theorem 1 does not hold for finite economies. 
Example 3.2. Consider a finite economy £, in which the commodity space is R!, and 
the set of traders is T = {1,2,3}. The space of states of nature is n = {WI,W2},  and 
F  = 2°. Traders' initial endowments are e(wl' 1)  = e(w2' 1)  = (60,0,0), e(wI' 2)  = 
e(w2,2)  = (0,60,0), and e(wI,3) = e(w2,3)  = (0,0,60). The information partition 
of traders 1 and 2 is  ITI  =  {{  WI, W2}},  and that of Trader 3 is  IT3  =  {{  WI}, {W2}} . 
All traders have the same prior, q =  (~, ~), and the same utility function, given for 
(w, (x,y,z)) En x R! by 
u(W, (x, y, z))  = Vx + Vu +..jZ. 
7 Define the allocation x in [  by 
and 
{ 
(19, 19, 19) 
X(Wl' t) = 
(22,22,22) 
t E {I, 2} 
t =  3, 
{ 
(13,13,13)  t  E {1,2} 
X(W2' t)  = 
(34,34,34)  t =  3. 
We show that x  is  an interim fine  core allocation of [, but it is not an ex-post core 
allocation of [. For t E {1,2} and wEn we have 
Now,  if y  is  an assignment in [  which is  feasible  for  {1,2}  at each state of nature, 
then for  all wEn we have 
min{El(U(·'Y(·' 1)) I  Fl V  F2)(w),E2(u(·,y(·,2)) I  Fl V  F2)(W)}  :::;  2V30 
< ~(Vi9  + v13). 
Therefore y  cannot be an interim fine improvement of {I, 2}  upon x on n. It is clear 
that if S  =1=  {1,2} is  a coalition, then it does not have an interim fine  improvement 
upon x on a non-empty event in ViEI(S) F i . Thus, x is an interim fine core allocation 
of [. Define an assignment y : n x T  ~  ~t by 
{
(3~, 30, 30)  (w, t) E n x {1,2} 
y(w, t)  = 
e(w,3)  otherwise. 
Then y  is  an ex-post improvement of {I, 2}  upon x  at the state of nature W2,  and 
therefore x is not an ex-post core allocation in [. 
Note that  i~ this argument we  have not assumed measurability of the blocking 
assignment y  with respect to the joint partition of the blocking coalition;  hence in 
this example Wilson's fine core is not a subset of the ex-post core either. 
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